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On InfoWar
LTC Nathan A. Buchheit
MAJ Todd L. Smith
D/EECS, United States Military Academy
Abstract
This paper discusses three dangers that accompany the integration of information technologies (IT) in the
military environment. While this paper addresses IT and implications of information warfare, many
similarities exist between the military and business organizations as they compete within their own unique
battle space. Specifically, the abundance of information, the accuracy of information, and the authority of
decision-makers are examined.

Introduction
As the physical volume of the battle space and the requisite span of control have expanded, commanders, the military, and
in many respects, the entire national defense system find themselves more and more dependent upon information-age technology.
Reviews of the Gulf War indicated that even with the tremendous increase in technologically advanced systems, commanders
desired an even more detailed analysis of the battlefield. In response to these types of requests, the United States Army has
committed considerable resources and attention of late to Information Operations. Army Vision 2010 stresses the importance
of incorporating technology in general and information technology in particular to the modern battlefield. Army Experiment
4 equips an entire Division with the latest in digital communications and information technology as a model for twenty-first
century units.
The Army has also created an Information Operations specialty in order to develop and utilize personnel in this area. As
General Gordon R. Sullivan, former Chief of Staff, United States Army, states "Information is combat power. Information is
the currency of victory on the battlefield" (Degroot and Nilson, 1995, p. 56). Modern strategists base plans and operations on
technologically-leveraged battlefields where manpower is supplemented and often replaced by information systems that provide
enhanced eyes and ears for the commander. Undeniably, the advantages of these information systems are too many to disregard.
However, serious consideration must also be given to both real and potential weaknesses that might result from this technological
dependence.
This paper thus takes a somewhat contrarian approach in that it identifies and discusses three potential dangers in the
advances described above. The first two of these dangers concern the abundance and accuracy of information available to
decision-makers. Carl von Clausewitz in his seminal work On War states that the “great part of the information obtained in War
is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful character" (Clausewitz, 1832, p. 86).
Clausewitz's reference to the value and accuracy of the available information is still applicable and is only exacerbated by both
the three dimensional nature and the lack of easily defined lines of demarcation in the modern battle space.
This third danger reflects the use of authority by decision-makers. Combined with the first two elements, it illustrates that
the danger represented by the Clausewitzian concepts of “fog” and “friction” remain relevant to the modern battlefield.
Clausewitz originally used these terms to explain the reality of war. He described friction both as "a force that theory can never
quite explain" and as "the countless minor incidents ... [which] combine to lower the general level of performance." Fog is the
uncertainty that wraps itself around every activity in war as well as “the general unreliability of information." While this paper
addresses IT and implications of information warfare, many similarities exist between the military and business organizations
as they compete within their own unique battle space. As (Simon, 1973) states, military organizations "…have been and still
are the initial testing grounds for most modern information processing technology" (p. 277).

Abundance
The first danger that we will encounter is a direct product of our ever-increasing ability to collect information. Information
can be defined in many different ways. The one most suited for the purpose of this discussion is that information derives from
observable facts or events. These facts or events are considered as data and must be perceived and interpreted to become
information. Information, then, is the result of two things: perceptions of occurrences (data) and the instructions required to
interpret that data and give it meaning. Quality information is counter to the fog of war and is a vital ingredient in providing
commanders an advantage against an enemy (Fogleman and Widnall, 1996).
The US Army understands implicitly the importance of quality information. General Sullivan states, “We are emphasizing
information because it is the key to a vast improvement in effectiveness” and “winning the information war is not simply about
intelligence, nor is it about data transmission. It is about integration. It is about taking the information that is available to any
given soldier and making it available to whoever needs it" (Sullivan, 1995, p. 11).
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But this ability of commanders to receive data at every level due to innovations in tactical, operational and strategic
communication technologies represents two dangers. Instant access to increasing amounts of data, including near-real-time
intelligence, manning rosters, weather forecasts, and battlefield targeting data - in addition to remote communication down to
the individual soldier - creates an overabundance of data for modern commanders.
Vice President Gore expresses the first danger in his book, Earth in the Balance, “We are drowning in information. We have
generated more data, statistics, words, formulas, images, documents and declarations than we can possibly absorb. And rather
than create new ways to understand and assimilate the information that we already have, we simply create more [information]
and at an increasingly rapid pace” (Riccardelli, 1995, p. 84). Data must be processed, filtered, and adjudicated in some manner
for the commander. Otherwise, the commander will soon find himself inundated and possibly suffering from ‘paralysis from
analysis’ as he desperately attempts to find the important information necessary to make decisions on the modern battlefield.
The second danger is the inability of leaders to ignore even the most trivial details. In fact, it is expected that leaders are
actively “managing” all aspects under their control, and that management is the knowledge of details. It is sometimes the case
that a senior leader knows a particular detail about a subordinate’s command that the subordinate did not know. The perception
is that the junior leader is not aware of the status of his or her section. To prevent this occurrence, leaders spend much more time
analyzing and tracking routine data and less time on operational issues.

Accuracy
Winn Schwartau in War on the Information Superhighway expresses the second danger represented from our massive ability
to collect and disseminate information to commanders. He observes that today's world seems to dictate that "the computer is
right," and whatever information the computer presents is taken as fact. During the Gulf War, analysts distributed overlays
pinpointing the exact positions of Iraqi Tanks. Logisticians also had maps showing the exact positions of allied supply positions.
The detail of this information seemed to verify its accuracy. It was on the map; it must be on the ground. However, the highly
fluid nature of the Gulf War outdated the maps prior to their distribution, and locating friendly and enemy positions was an
inexact science.
Beusmans and Wieckert (1989) agree with Clausewitz’s distrust of information. They state that “a tenant of battle is that
information is never reliable or complete” (p. 943). The ability to collect information in real time does not degrade this
assessment. The majority of information is still entered by humans. Environmental stress, fatigue, fear, lack of training, and
ignorance of global details can lead to inaccurate reports. Electronic sensors can also be erroneous. The abundance of electronic
equipment together with downsizing has led to a backlog of calibration and maintenance. In fact, seventy-four percent of officers
said that they would not trust an automated system to evaluate the readiness of a unit (Smith, 1996).

Authority
The final danger is the shifting focus of leadership. Military leaders have long been taught to lead from the front, to see the
battlefield from the front lines. Leaders now have access to information that spans the battlefield and transcends every level of
their organization. But is this necessarily good?
There is an inherent tendency to fix problems, but military leaders, consistent with (Jarvenpaa and Ives, 1991), “…have
neither the time nor the expertise to deeply participate in sales, purchasing, R&D, or other decisions.” (p. 211) Leaders are
inundated with information and problems within their organization that could and should be solved at much lower levels. This
reduces the ability of senior leadership to focus on long term objectives and strategic planning.
Not only does this prevent the senior leadership from concentrating on strategic issues, but it also reduces the development
of junior managers. The focus has now shifted to “fire fighting” rather than management. A simple inquiry by a commander
can dictate the priorities of subordinates for several days, regardless of the commander’s intent. This can lead to a shift of focus
from management to information management. Rather than ensuring the efficiency of their organization, managers utilize their
time ensuring that the collected information is accurate and that there are no potential problems. Rather than spending their time
in the maintenance bays and operational cells, they spend their time in their office near their information appliances.

Conclusion
The battlefield and the conduct of battle have changed greatly since Clausewitz recorded his philosophy. Recently, the
Information Age has greatly accelerated our capability for obtaining and analyzing information. Undoubtedly, this capability
will greatly increase our efficiency. However, we must understand the limitations of technology and the merits of leadership.
This was true in Clausewitz’s day and is true in our own.
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